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An Examination of the Status of 
Probability Sampling in the Courts 
Boyd Randall 
Brigham Young University 
Paul Frishkoff 
University of Oregon 
Auditing researchers, staggering under an ever-increasing blizzard of pro-
nouncements, articles, and memoranda, might well be disposed to believe that 
complexity feeds on itself. For example, two themes which were of much con-
cern—perhaps even dominant—at the first two University of Kansas Auditing 
Symposia1 were the increase in litigation against auditors and the growing 
sophistication of statistical sampling techniques in auditing. This paper attempts 
to examine the interaction between the two. 
Indeed, his paper arose directly as a result of the 1974 Symposium. At that 
conference, one of the present authors raised the question of whether statistical 
sampling (i.e., probability sampling) would be a better defense in the courts 
than judgment sampling. There appeared to be some division among prac-
titioners present at the conference. 
Practitioner Opinions 
Some felt that the use of probability sampling would ameliorate the position 
of the defense in a lawsuit, since probability sampling is viewed as more "scien-
tific," as encompassing more up-to-date technology, and as more susceptible to 
mathematical "proof" of its validity. 
Others were more skeptical or at least agnostic. They felt that expert wit-
nesses might debate the merits of a particular probability sampling plan to the 
ultimate utter confusion of jurors and jurists. Their contention was that the 
"expert judgment" of a highly trained professional, on the other hand, was less 
suspect and less susceptible to point-by-point rebuttal. 
Our purpose in this paper is twofold. First, we will examine past court 
decisions to discover whether the courts have shown any preference for prob-
ability sampling. Then we will examine cases in which probability sampling was 
used, either by one of the parties or by the courts themselves, to see what implicit 
standards for such sampling may be emerging from the judicial process. 
For readers who are curious about the outcome of these questions, yet less 
than enthusiastic about wading through the details of this paper, we will admit 
at the outset that our conclusions are more equivocal and more tentative than 
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either they or we might have wished. Auditing remains an inappropriate field 
for uncertainty-avoiders! 
Some Definitions 
Probability sampling plans, to quote one source implicitly used by the courts, 
". . . make use of the theory of probability to combine a suitable procedure for 
selecting sample items with an appropriate procedure for summarizing the test 
results so the inferences may be drawn and risks calculated from the test results 
by the theory of probability. For any given set of conditions there will usually be 
several possible plans, all valid, but differing in speed, simplicity, and cost."2 
Simple random sampling is but one of many possible applications of probability 
sampling. 
Judgment (non-random) sampling plans, on the other hand, ". . . have one 
common characteristic: the probability that an individual (item) is included in 
the sample is unknown. . . . When the determination of the individuals (items) 
to be included in a sample involves personal judgment, one cannot have an 
objective measure of the reliability of the sample results, because the various 
individuals (items) may have differing and unknown chances of being drawn."3 
A census involves the examination of all items in a population, rather than a 
sample thereof. The economics and timing of such procedures preclude their use 
for more facets of an audit. 
Extent of Use of Probability Sampling 
The official policy of the AICPA has been to condone both probability and 
judgment sampling.4 An examination that we made of a (non-random) sample 
of six recent auditing textbooks indicated that judgment sampling was not 
explicitly condemned, but the preponderance of material under the heading 
"sampling" dealt with probability sampling. 
Most accredited Schools of Business have required one or more courses in 
statistical theory and techniques for at least the past decade or two. A l l national 
C P A firms and the AICPA have offered training programs or modules on 
probability sampling as well. One might expect, then, that probability sampling 
is used overwhelming. This is apparently not the case, however. 
A questionnaire survey by Jacobs5 of C P A firms in the Los Angeles area re-
vealed a wide disparity in the use of statistical sampling within a given office, 
among firms of a given size, and among firms of differing sizes. As might have 
been expected, the use of statistical sampling by national firms was far greater 
than by locals, but the use was far from universal in any size grouping. 
A more extensive questionnaire survey, undertaken by Strawser and Hubbard 6 
confirmed these findings; their research also indicated that utilization of statistical 
sampling techniques has been increasing fairly rapidly in recent years. These 
results were consistent with an unscientific face-to-face inquiry of various Port-
land, Oregon practitioners undertaken by one of the present authors during the 
past year. 
Judgment sampling, then, is still very much alive, and its acceptability in the 
courts is thus not a trivial problem. 
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Survey of Cases 
We surveyed a wide variety of cases where statistical sampling was an 
explicit issue or in which it was mentioned by the courts. We wish that we 
could report that we found The Definitive Audit Case or a truly helpful case of 
any kind. Instead, we found that references to sampling usually arose where the 
technique was being used to gather evidence for the court, rather than where it 
had been used prior to the litigation, such as in an auditor's test of transactions. 
Therefore, we concentrated on court pronouncements that suggested standards 
that should be used in sampling. Such standards, we argued, should be applicable 
in almost any context, and in particular where an auditor's use of a sampling 
method might be questioned relative to the standards recognized by the courts. 
Implicit Court Standards for Sampling in General 
There is no codified law regarding standards for sampling. Yet standards of 
other bodies, while not of themselves court standards, become so indirectly when 
they are recognized and cited as such by the courts on sufficient occasions. 
"Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases" is 
a Report of the Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Protracted 
Litigation. This report was adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United 
States in March, 1960. It reached the following conclusions on the question of 
sampling: 
Scientifically designed samples and polls have received increasing ac-
ceptance in recent years in government and in industry. The important 
question to be considered in a given case is whether the contemplated or 
proffered sample or poll is admissible under existing rules of evidence. 
Samples [confined to observable facts]. When a sample is offered 
through the testimony of the sampler, the report on the sample examined 
(i.e., on the count of units or the test borings, in the samples noted above) 
usually does not involve hearsay. In order to project this report, however, 
the burden of proof rests upon the offeror to show, by the testimony of 
a statistical expert, that the sample was selected in accordance with ac-
cepted principles of sampling so that it properly represents the universe. 
Note. Once this is established, there remain only questions of relevancy, 
materiality and weight.7 
The note in the above quote refers to two sources of accepted principles of 
sampling. They are: 
1. Munitions Board Standards, Agency of the Department of Defense, and 
2. The American Society for Testing and Materials. 
We were unable to locate the Munitions Board Standards, but we did examine 
the relevant standards of The American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM) in some detail.8 
A perusal of ASTM's standards for statistical sampling reveal—by the sophisti-
cated nature of the language, mathematical notation, and footnote references— 
that these standards were enacted by statisticians for use by those with considerable 
grounding in the field of probability and statistics. 
ASTM's pronouncements also reveal, time and again, a pronounced preference 
95 
for probability sampling and an aversion to wholesale nonrandom sampling. 
For instance: 
In order to make any estimate for a lot or for a process, on the basis 
of a sample, it is necessary to select the units in the sample at random. 
. . . The only universally acceptable definition of a random selection is 
is one made by the use of random numbers, which in effect is the 
guarantee of thorough stirring of the sampling units in a lot.9 
Selection by use of random numbers need not be more onerous or costly 
than hit-or-miss methods of sample selection, provided the sampling plan 
is thoughtfully formulated. . . . Randomness is obtained by positive action; 
a random selection is not merely a haphazard selection, nor one declared 
to be without bias. . . . However, mechanical selection is still usually 
preferable to a judgment-selection.10 
The foregoing paragraphs do not mean that nonrandom and judgment 
samples, for example, may provide useful information for the efficient 
design of a probability sampling plan. . . . It also should be noted that 
judgment plays an important role in the design of a probability sampling 
plan. For example, it may be used to assess costs, to estimate spreads and 
likely values of variances; also definitions of strata. In the actual prob-
ability sample, however, judgment is not used in the selection of the 
individual items of the sample, nor in making the inferences, nor in cal-
culating the risks of decisions based wholly on the sample or succession 
of samples.11 
Thus, nonrandom sampling is relegated by A S T M to a role of amassing initial 
evidence when little is known about the underlying population. Such might be 
the case in a preliminary stage of an audit of a previously unaudited client, for 
instance, but would not likely be the case in the actual selection of receivables to 
be confirmed for the engagement, and especially would not be supportable for an 
engagement that has been of long standing. 
The courts have cited the Handbook, and thus implicitly the A S T M standards, 
on at least three occasions. None involved auditing, however, and none involved 
a head-on-head confrontation between probability and judgment sampling. 
In Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank,12 the courts rejected plaintiff's 
sampling plan in an action under the Sherman Act for treble damages and 
injunctive relief. The court held that the restraint involved in a "no check" plan 
whereby school employees were required to take some affirmative action to 
transfer funds from defendant bank to a bank of the employee's choice was not 
shown to be unreasonable. 
. . . (T)he tendency is to admit the results of properly conducted 
surveys for whatever they are worth in spite of the hearsay difficulty. . . . 
In this case, however, we do not even reach the hearsay question as it 
relates to the admissibility of surveys, for we think the trial court was well 
within its bounds of discretion in refusing to admit a poll conducted as 
was this one. 
A survey is inadmissible when the sample is clearly not representative 
of the universe it is intended to reflect. See Hawley Products C. v. United 
States Trunk Co., 1 Cir., 259 F. 2d 69, 77; Handbook of Recommended 
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351,429; . . . Here 
the universe was either all school board and hospital employees under the 
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plan, or at a minimum all school board employees under the plan. The 
sample was chosen from neither of these groups but instead from those 
employees who at one time banked with appellants and later switched 
exclusively to Commercial Security.13 
In another case, Berman v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc.,14 the court 
rejected a poll as evidence, citing the Handbook, and finding the poll to be 
entirely inadequate. One reason was because the sample size was less than 1% of 
a universe of 3,500 to 5,000. It is of interest that the A S T M standards include a 
section replete with mathematical notation entitled "Equations for Calculating 
Sample Size," with the strong implicit assumption that probability sampling is 
used and that characteristics of the underlying probability distribution are known 
or can be estimated.15 
In a third case in which the Handbook was cited by the court, Grotrian, 
Helfferich, Schuz, etc. v. Steinway and Sons,16 the court held that the survey 
offered in evidence met the criteria for admissibility of samples found in the 
Handbook. 
Court's Examination of Underlying Probability Distribution 
The underlying probability distribution on which a sampling plan was based 
arose in two cases involving depreciation, both, however, concerned tax litiga-
tion, not financial auditing. 
In Commissioner v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp.,17 the question was whether a 
television network affiliation for a two-year term, which is automatically renew-
able in the absence of termination by the affirmative act of either of the parties, 
for an unlimited number of successive two-year terms, is a depreciable asset. 
The Seventh Circuit Court held that it was not a depreciable asset. 
The theory of the statistical tables compiled was that an annual rate of 
contract termination for each pertinent period could be obtained by divid-
ing the total number of years commenced by all the affiliation contracts 
during a given period into the total number of contract terminations 
occurring during the same period. Using that termination rate, taxpayer's 
expert witnesses testified that the average life expectancy of any given 
contract could be determined by applying the Poisson-Exponential Theory 
of Failure. The crux of that theory is that the percentage of failure of items 
to which it is applied is a constant. . . . 
Adopting that theory, and applying it with some modification to the 
statistical history, the Tax Court found that an estimated useful life of the 
WISH and W A N E C B A affiliation contracts could be determined with 
reasonable accuracy, and that use of a straight-line method over 20 years 
was a reasonable basis for depreciation of the contracts. 
We think the Tax Court erred. . . . 1 8 
It is likewise clear that the stipulated exhibit graphically refutes the 
existence of a basic premise upon which the Poisson Theory relies, namely, 
that the life expectancy of all contracts is the same regardless of the length 
of duration of the contract.19 
Super Foods Services, Inc. v. United States20 is similar to Indiana Broad-
casting. Super Foods owned franchise contracts with grocers; they attempted to 
depreciate the contracts, but the IRS claimed that the contracts had indefinite 
97 
lives. The plantiff introduced a study of 486 contracts; the study tended to 
show that any contract which had been in force more than 12 months had an 
average life of 86 months. Expert testimony was that the contracts "display a 
definite and consistent pattern of termination." The government relied on 
Indiana Broadcasting for the proposition that statistics of past performance do 
not reliably predict termination dates. In ruling for the taxpayer, the court 
distinguished Indiana Broadcasting because in the present case the IRS had 
introduced no evidence of their own to controvert plaintiff's statistical evidence. 
Court's Examinaion of Sampling Plan Used by Litigant 
Johnson v. White21 was an action by Connecticut welfare recipients against 
the state commissioner of welfare. The commissioner had converted the F A D C 
program to a "flat grant" system to simplify A F D C payments by averaging 
budgeted needs of each size of assistance unit and making identical payments to 
each family of a given size. The court held that such averaging was permissible, 
and explained: 
The defendant adopted a pre-sample confidence interval of 95%, 
plus or minus 10%; and a post-sample check determined that the selected 
level of confidence had in fact been met. The defendant's sampling tech-
nique was approved by H E W . The plaintiff's claim that in certain 
components of need for certain assistance unit sizes, the sample size was 
too small to guarantee the selected level of confidence. The defendant's 
confidence level, however, was for the average of budgeted needs as a 
whole, rather than for each component in the standard of need. Giving 
due weight to the expert opinion of H E W , the court finds that the 
defendant's sampling technique was adequate.22 
Use of Sampling Techniques by Court Itself 
In Rosado v. Wyman,23 also a welfare case, New York welfare recipients 
claimed that the state impermissibly lowered the standard of need by eliminating 
items arbitrarily in 1970. Social Security Act Sec. 402 (a) (23) provides that a 
state may not lower its standard of need by arbitrarily eliminating items which 
were included before enactment of the amended statue in 1969. 
The court used statistical sampling techniques to determine if amounts paid 
under the 1970 plan accounted for certain special need grants paid in 1968. The 
amount of aid received by a sample of 1968 recipients was compared to the 
proposed 1970 schedule. The court found that 1968 recipients received more than 
was allowed by the 1970 schedule, refuting New York's allegation of paying 
100% of the standard of need in both years. 
Some Other Illustrative Cases 
Many anti-trust cases employ statistics. In bank merger cases, such as United 
States v. Philadelphia National Bank24 and United States v. Manufacturers Han-
over Trust Co.,25 the government used rather simple arithmetical statistics to 
show the effect of mergers. For a detailed analysis of these two cases, and—in 
particular—for suggestions for the use of statistics in similar cases, see Lozowick 
et a l . 2 6 
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An older case involving statistics, a landmark anti-trust action, was United 
States v. United Shoe Machinery?27 The court discussed minor problems with 
the government's choice of universe and of sample selection, but accepted the 
sample pragmatically, because ". . . if anti-trust trials are to be kept manageable, 
samples must be used, and a sample which is in general reasonable should not 
be rejected in the absence of an offer of a better sample."28 
In Hawley Products Co. v. United States Trunk Co.29 (a case, incidentally, 
cited by the court in Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank, which we 
discussed earlier) and in a related case, American Luggage Works, v. United 
States Trunk Co.,30 plaintiff attempted to prove that its design for suitcases had 
acquired a secondary meaning. The survey was "inadmissible to show that in 
the market of ultimate consumers the plaintiff's design had acquired a secondary 
meaning when the universe surveyed consisted of retailers."31 
In International Milling Co. v. Robin Hood Popcorn Co.32 the evidence 
included a consumer action survey designed to determine whether purchasers 
associated the product packaged by International Milling with the product pack-
aged by Robin Hood. The Commission went into detail in describing the survey, 
the questions asked, the selection of a sample and the standard deviation expected. 
Readers may be familiar with the use of sampling in cases where a defendant 
or plaintiff has asserted that a jury is racially imbalanced and thus in violation of 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. In cases such as Carter v. Jury Commission,33 
courts have been willing to accept a statistical analysis of the population and use 
that probability to determine that a certain proportion of jurors should be of a 
particular race. (Such cases, of course, involve arguments from the population, 
rather than from a sample.) A recent article on jury selection goes into detail 
on the statistical problems involved.34 
Sampling Standards Employed by Internal Revenue Service 
The IRS issued some rather lengthy standards of sampling in conjunction with 
the timing of trading stamp redemptions. These standards explicitly condone 
only probability sampling. Thus, "the taxpayer may use any sampling procedures 
that are in accord with generally accepted probability sampling techniques. . . . 
While no specific requirements are established for the sampling expert responsible 
for the design of the study, it is recognized probability sampling is a highly 
specialized field and that otherwise competent statisticians may not be qualified 
in the field of probability sampling. . . . The sampling plan which is used must 
conform to the standards of the 'Report of Committee on Standards of Probability 
Sampling for Legal Evidence—Admissibility of Data from Probability Sam-
ples.' " 3 5 
This report, published by the Society of Business Advisory Professions, Inc., 
in cooperation with New York University, is remarkably similar in tone and 
substance to the previously cited A S T M documents. The report does not allow 
for the possibility of judgment sampling, and indeed makes the solemn assertion 
(in two different places) that: "The interpretation of a statistical calculation such 
as the standard error is not a matter of opinion, nor of judgment, but is a 
mathematical consequence."36 
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Approval of Probability Sampling by U.S. Congress 
In a bill approved in 1964, the House of Representatives specifically permitted 
the use of statistical sampling procedures in the examination of vouchers. A 
detailed report accompanying the bill discusses the appropriate use of statistical 
sampling in the examination of vouchers and the reasons supporting increased 
governmental adoption of statistical analysis.37 
A Most Tentative Conclusion 
No absolutely definitive case has yet arisen to demonstrate that judgment 
sampling will not be allowed by the courts in auditing. Nonetheless, some trends 
seem apparent to us. The courts—and such quasi-judicial agencies as IRS—are 
relying more heavily on sophisticated statistical documents whose standards barely 
condone, and certainly do not encourage, nonrandom sampling when probability 
sampling is feasible. 
We can not conclude with the lame epithet that "further research needs to be 
done." There is no more "data" left to examine, and additional "research" will be 
effected by the courts themselves. Our murky crystal ball suggests that a land-
mark case involving sampling in an auditing context will arise within the next 
few years. We caution those auditors who continue to use judgment sampling in 
the presence of feasible probability sampling procedures to be prepared to defend 
their logic in so doing. For that matter, given some of the decisions cited, we 
urge auditors who use probability sampling to be prepared to defend their 
particular sampling plans in terms of demonstrating that their sample results can 
indeed be argued to be representative of the underlying universe. 
Addendum: Sampling Lost, Sampling Vindicated? 
The following case has been verbally cited to us by several colleagues. So far 
as we know, it has not been officially reported. Moreover, it is somewhat dated 
and was tried on a municipal court level only. Nonetheless, for the sake of com-
pleteness, we include it for the interested reader. 
In Sears Roebuck and Co. vs. the City of Inglewood,38 Sears sued for a sales 
tax refund of $27,000. Sears had found an error in their own local records as to 
the extent of out-of-city sales, such sales not being subject to the municipal tax. 
In support of their contention, Sears conducted a random sample of sales slips, 
which indicated that the refund ought to be $28,250, plus or minus $4,200, at a 
95% confidence interval. 
The judge ruled against any sampling technique! This ruling was not predi-
cated on any statistical oversight in Sears's procedures, but on the judge's conten-
tion that the amount of the refund must be determined exactly, without any 
possible error in estimation, however small. That is, he insisted, as required by 
the applicable statute, that Sears demonstrate a lack of sales tax liability for 
each invoice! 
Since the Court permitted Sears to perform a "complete audit," the plaintiff 
did not appeal the case. The complete audit, of which the sample had constituted 
only 4%, revealed a liability of $26,750.22, well within the confidence interval. 
As we said, we doubt that this case constitutes an important precedent, since 
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special conditions were present which the judge interpreted to preclude any 
form of sampling. If sampling is applicable, judges can be expected to follow 
the precedents that have been cited, and even if a judge does not understand all 
of the ramifications of sampling, sampling is at least likely to be tolerated. 
It is of interest, however, that the author who cites this case goes on to 
comment, hypothetically, ". . . if (the judge) had refused to admit the amount 
of the claim as $27,000 because it was based on a judgment sample as opposed 
to the random sampling insisted on here, that also would have been a valid 
objection."39 
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